White Paper: Hard Lessons in Resilience

What We Learned from the Looting of Our Construction Site and Trade School in Haiti

Executive Summary

Late last year our five-acre construction site and trade school in Haiti - an ambitious project designed to raise up future construction leaders of capability and character - was attacked and looted by an armed gang amid escalating civil unrest in our area near Port-au-Prince. While the incursion caused damage to our buildings and loss of valuable equipment, the event provided critical insight into how infrastructure, planning, and security protocols can mitigate damage and further preserve our capacity to pursue our mission for the long term.

This white paper outlines five (5) key lessons learned from the incident, focusing on the value of hardened physical security, the effectiveness of welded metal containers, the role of early warning systems, and the dangers of overlooking equipment immobilization. These takeaways serve not only as a postmortem but also as a guide for our future site planning in Haiti and other conflict-prone regions in general.

1.  Robust Static Security Infrastructure Is Essential

The attack revealed the stark limitations of relying on temporary chain link fencing and basic perimeter controls in a high-risk environment like Haiti. While we were aware of warning signs of rising insecurity due to encroaching gang activity for some time, the site remained vulnerable due to the absence of more robust static defenses. 

1.1. What Was Lacking:

• Insufficient number of reinforced concrete walls around perimeter. While we had a portion of our road-facing perimeter wall made out of Fortium security wall panels (Extollo’s specialized reinforced concrete panels), we had not yet fully encircled our site with these walls due to numerous factors - time and capacity constraints being the biggest one. 

• Inadequate vehicle access controls (gates). Our main gate was fabricated using 2” metal tubing, covered with 0.25” metal sheeting, rolling on a metal track. This gate had numerous points of vulnerability, and under a breach attack by a vehicle would have easily buckled. In the attack, the gate was accessed from the inside, easily opened to allow vehicles and equipment in and out. 

• Too many linear feet of perimeter fencing made from lightweight materials easily cut or pushed down. We depended heavily on chain link fencing and metal fencing fabricated using metal tubing to secure the majority of our perimeter. The initial probing attacks focused on the chain link portions of our security perimeter, allowing groups of attackers to easily cut through or push open sections of the fencing. 

• Absence of vehicle intrusion prevention. With our main gate being the only barrier for vehicles, it would not have withstood the force of even a light-weight car or truck pushing on the gate. We had nothing in place to fortify the gate and make it resilient to breach by a ramming vehicle. 

1.2. What We Should Have Had:

• Reinforced concrete walls around the entire perimeter at least 8 feet high, topped with spike rails or barbed wire. While we did have 120’ of our Fortium security wall panels erected along a section of our most vulnerable fenceline, at the time (1) this wall section did not yet have spike rails or barbed wire installed along the top, and (2) these wall panels only ran along a small portion of our perimeter. We are confident that had our entire perimeter fence been constructed using our Fortium security wall panels with spike or wire topping, the attackers would not have breached any section of our fence line. 

• Bollards and heavy-duty gates to prevent vehicle entry/exit. A gate fabricated out of heavier gauge tubing and sheeting would have added greater deterrence, as a gate is typically the weakest point in static protection / security fencing. Additionally, the gate’s ends would have slid back into a reinforced concrete channel, significantly mitigating the gate being pulled back or opened from the side. Yet even a heavy-duty gate alone will not be able to withstand a sustained attack from a ramming vehicle. Thus having installed at least two (2) retractable bollards immediately inside the gate would have significantly increased the fortitude of the gate from vehicle ramming and denied vehicle entry and significantly mitigated vehicle and heavy equipment removal from our site. 

• Elevated guard towers and surveillance nodes. Another project on our list was to rebuild our current single-story guard building to a two-story, reinforced concrete structure using our Fortium panels. Since our Fortium panels are bullet proof, this would have not only given our security guards a higher vantage point to observe and potentially repel attack, but these panels would have offered vital protection from projectiles and small arms fire. Because of our existing static protection being insufficient, we ordered all personnel on our site, including security, to evacuate the site as soon as it became clear an attack was imminent.

Takeaways:

In high-risk environments like Haiti, security must be engineered into the site. Passive deterrents like light gauge fencing and simple metal gates are insufficient. Concrete, steel, and deliberate design choices are the true first line of defense. Going forward we will secure all our sites using Fortium reinforced concrete panels and the other robust deterrents outlined above. 

2.  Metal Containers Are Invaluable for Securing Assets

Among the most effective security measures we had in place were several 20- and 40-foot shipping containers used for storage and documentation. Prior to the attack, some containers were welded shut using 0.25” metal plates as part of our contingency planning.

2.1 Performance During the Attack:

• Welded containers showed either unsuccessful attempts at entry, or were completely untouched. The specialty equipment and skills required to gain entrance to containers welded shut proved to be beyond the capacity and/or motivation of the attackers, as it appeared from video feeds (we had web-enabled video cameras throughout our site) that these attackers were principally interested in seizing easily-accessible equipment rather than that which required sustained, specialty tool-required effort. 

• Welded containers contained high-value tools, documents, digital backups, and specialty equipment. Those items that we valued the most that we could not relocate off campus, or easily disassemble (such as our solar power systems that were installed on our buildings - see below) were protected in these containers. This saved a considerable amount of money and logistics not having to replace these specialty items. 

• Attackers focused on easier, accessible targets and did not spend much time attempting to breach the containers that were welded shut. As mentioned above, the difficulty in opening containers welded shut was an adequate deterrent. That said, the attackers did take ample time to disassemble our solar power systems from the roofs of our buildings, removing 30+ panels from the roof of our Training Center, and removing all 24 of our lithium gel batteries. This was one of the more egregious losses to our campus.

2.2 Practical Benefits:

• Low cost compared to permanent structures with comparable security. Shipping containers provide storage that is relatively low-cost, immediate, and weather-proof. The only security weakness of shipping containers is the ease of access, and the ineffectiveness of padlocks to secure them during an attack. Welding container doors shut is inexpensive and requires minimal investment in the tools required to do this. 

• Fire-resistant and extremely difficult to breach quickly without specialty tools. As we were aware that other properties that were attacked had buildings set on fire, we had prepared our containers to resist fire damage. Another concern was damage to items inside the container in the event a fire was set on or next to the container. Protecting interior items can be accomplished using numerous types of materials that act as a heat barrier on the inside of the container wall, or that cover the item. As mentioned above, removing metal plates welded onto the container doors requires specialty tools and requires the time and skill to do it. 

• Mobile and can be repositioned or clustered for added defense. With the use of heavy equipment, containers can be positioned to make access into the containers - even if the doors are breached - very difficult or virtually impossible. Pushing containers together door to door, or configuring them in such a way that all doors are set against a side of another container in a cluster, requires moving the containers to access the doors - a “heavy lift” for any attacker. In our specific situation, we had enough warning that an attack might have been imminent, giving us time to relocate our containers as mentioned above. Thankfully, the welded plates were enough of a deterrent.

Takeaway:

Containers offer a cost-effective, scalable solution for securing critical assets, especially when welded or relocated into protective positioning. Containers with doors that can be reinforced should be standard infrastructure for any project operating in volatile areas.

3. Early Warning Systems Save Lives

Although the material losses were significant, the most important success was the safe evacuation of all personnel well before the gang arrived. This was made possible by our local early warning network which provided hours of lead time.

3.1 What Worked:

• Strong community ties with local partners and informants. Community goodwill and local advocates ensured that we were made aware of gang activity in our larger area and, more specifically, gang movement toward our site. We initiated our lock-down protocols when the gang attack appeared possible - not imminent - and we were able to fall back on experience and training to lock down campus, secure or remove valuables, and evacuate staff. 

• Active monitoring of road conditions, radio traffic, and local chatter. Through our networks within and outside our local area, we were aware of gang activity, including probing activities in our area. As the gang moved in and through our local community, we were able to track their progress and take action on the real-time information we received. Building goodwill and trusted relationships with our local community members was a key asset in this kind of information gathering. Much of our decision-making was based on the on-going intelligence we received from our local community. 

• Pre-established communication trees and evacuation plans. Our President, General Manager, and other key staff were in constant communication as the situation was monitored through the communication system mentioned above. With our standard operating procedures related to campus lockdown and staff evacuation, along with the experience of doing this a few times, the communication between leadership on the ground and remote leadership was seamless. Modern communication technology made this possible, including Starlink-enabled wifi and Haiti-based cellular networks.  

3.2 Evacuation Highlights:

• All staff were accounted for and safely removed. This was priority #1 for all our staff and contractors, and we took no chances - evacuating the last remnant of security guards when an attack was confirmed to be imminent. 

• Vital documents and select tools were secured or removed. Knowing what and where key materials were stored and were to be relocated to in the specific container helped simplify a stressful situation. Even with this preparation, some documents and tools were accessed and stolen, revealing to us that we still had not adequately prepared for the size of the attack that hit us. 

• Lockdown procedures were initiated for welded containers. With training and practice, we were able to completely lock down our site, including welding containers shut, in less than two (2) hours. That we had gotten so proficient at welding our many containers shut was an aspect of our lockdown protocol we were proud of.

Takeaway:

No amount of infrastructure can replace the value of timely intelligence and evacuation planning. Early warning systems are a human-centered, cost-effective defense strategy that directly saves lives and protects the most valuable assets.

4. Failure to Disable Vehicles and Equipment Enabled Further Damage

One critical oversight was the failure to fully disable our vehicles and heavy equipment prior to evacuation. These assets were not only stolen - they were used to help destroy and loot other buildings on our site, and on other properties in our area. Painfully, we had relocated the vehicles to a safer location earlier in the period of unrest, and had brought these vehicles back to our campus just before we were attacked. 

4.1 Consequences:

• Our backhoe, with our logo painted on it, was used to break into structures and break through walls and doors to gain full access to valuable equipment, supplies, and other resources. We had not anticipated the extent to which our own equipment would be used against us. It is understandable to believe that a building made of concrete blocks will provide ample protection, yet against heavy equipment, a block wall can be easily breached. Additionally, some of our buildings were constructed out of metal studs and metal sheeting, allowing for easy access by our backhoe. 

• Vehicles were loaded with stolen materials and able to flee the site rapidly with no hindrances. It was doubly heartbreaking to know that our own vehicles were used to great effect to loot our property. Since our vehicles were kept in very good working order due to our Auto Care Service (Servis Sven Machin) program, as well as the off-road modifications we did to all our vehicles, these vehicles were perfect for transporting stolen goods off our campus. Older and/or less quality vehicles the gang had been using were abandoned on our site, replaced by our well-maintained trucks and SUVs. 

• Equipment was later observed being used by gangs in nearby towns. Particularly painful was that our branding (logo painted on the sides) was on the backhoe used to break into properties and buildings of other organizations in our area. Additionally, our trucks were used to remove valuables from other organizations and companies in our area. This required us to share publicly (Facebook, emails) so as to mitigate public relations (PR) and brand damage due to our vehicles and equipment being used to commit crimes. But far beyond the potential branding damage was the knowledge that the very equipment we owned for the sake of adding value to Haiti was being used to do the very opposite of its intended purpose. We had no idea the extent of the damage our “Extollo” equipment would do to our neighbors and friends. This is a grievous error we will never repeat.

4.2 Preventive Measures We Overlooked:

• Adding water to all of the fuel tanks to completely disable the engine’s capability to burn fuel in the engine, requiring significant time and effort to bring the vehicle back into operation. While this will not immediately disable an engine, water disrupts the fuel-air mixture during combustion and with enough water can render the engine unusable after a short period of time. Resolving the complications of a large amount of water in the tank and engine is a significant undertaking, and possibly one that attackers are not interested in trying to fix. At the least, the functioning of the vehicles would have been severely impacted, reducing the ease at which our property was looted and limiting the use of our vehicles to commit other crimes in our local community.

• Removing batteries or immobilizing electronic control systems. While we recognize that a battery can easily be replaced (and one of our vehicles was stolen in part due to the gang sourcing a battery to replace the one removed by us), it is worthwhile to remove it due to the logistical challenge of finding multiple batteries to start and run a vehicle fleet. An even more robust disabling tool is an electronic immobilizer that works by cutting power to the fuel pump, ignition, or starter motor unless a hidden switch is activated or a code is entered. For our most valuable vehicles and equipment we could have used a GPS-enabled remote immobilizer to render our equipment unusable. 

• Applying wheel clamps/boots to render the vehicles immobile. Wheel boots, especially those made from high-quality steel, can be a significant deterrent to theft. However, these wheel clamps can be defeated with specialty tools and ample time. While not to be depended upon as the only protective measure, wheel clamps/boots can add to the deterrence when paired with the other measures outlined above. 

Takeaway:

Our operational equipment should have remained offsite, or immobilized in such a volatile zone. Fully disabling, locking, or relocating vehicles must be standard operating procedure prior to site evacuation, keeping in mind that multiple layers of protection is key.

5. Emergency Protocols and Redundant Systems Reduced Long-Term Impact

Despite the severity of the attack, our capacity to recover remained intact, thanks to sound contingency planning, off-site backups, and secure storage.

5.1 Recovery Strengths:

• Key equipment and materials survived inside welded containers. As discussed above, much of our most important equipment and tools remained safe inside highly secured containers. This allowed us to later remove these valuable and hard to replace items to start another campus in the north of the country. Having this key equipment and materials readily available meant that we were able to start operations much sooner. 

• Use of cloud-based storage and tools limited disruption. Having moved the vast majority of our documents and business systems to the cloud enabled us to continue operationally regardless of the attack. Additionally, with our payroll and vendor payments largely using digital payment (MonCash, bank EFT, etc) and our accounting software solely online (Quickbooks Online), we were able to maintain all business operations with relatively little disruption. That we had already implemented video meetings, cloud storage of all business documents and systems, and multiple sites using a Starlink internet connection, we were able to continue our business operations at pace. The cloud-based nature of our business operations proved to be a major success for us.

• Local team members were able to return to the site and begin repairs and reinforcement of critical buildings to mitigate opportunistic theft. Soon after the attack, the gang retreated to their stronghold south of us and it was reported that unknown individuals were entering our property to take items left by the gang. We understood this to be merely opportunistic theft, and would cease when we were able to fix our gate and fencing. Not long after the attackers left our area were some of our staff able to return to our campus to begin securing our site. Vigilance and maintaining our intelligence gathering were key during this time, as we did not want to put anyone in harm's way. Thankfully, our campus was quickly secured, allowing the slow clean up process to begin. 

5.2 What Enabled This Resilience:

• Established emergency protocols and training for staff. Preparation is a vital component of mitigating loss and damage, and hardening our emotional toughness in the midst of heartbreak and discouragement. That we were able to weather this storm because of our protocols and training helped immensely as we turned the corner towards rebuilding. 

• Routine drills on evacuation and equipment lockdown. It is said that “the future is bright, but it’s wise to keep an umbrella handy” and “it is better to have and not need than to need and not have.” We were fortunate to have lived through situations that required us to evacuate staff, lock down our campus, and set our emergency protocols into motion. We had also, as a construction company, put into place trainings related to numerous types of emergencies. All of this helped us be mentally and physically prepared for when the real emergency hit. Having actually done the activities of lockdown and evacuation made the actual emergency slightly less stressful, allowing us to protect our property, assets, and people that much better. Had we not done these real-life drills, we would have been much less prepared and much less effective in implementing our security protocols.

• Strategic dispersal of critical assets to avoid single points of failure. Following the principle of diversification, our multiple layers of protection gave us compounding security that independently would have been insufficient to protect our people and our assets.

Takeaway:

Security is more than a wall - it’s a mindset. Planning for failure, dispersing risk, and training personnel make the difference between a total loss and a setback.

Conclusion

While the attack on our Haitian site was a deeply challenging event, it delivered invaluable lessons in physical security, operational discipline, and the human element of crisis response. These five takeaways are not theoretical - they are field-tested, high-impact insights that can be implemented immediately at other at-risk sites.

Resilience is built through design, preparation, and humility - knowing that risk is not a possibility but a certainty in fragile environments. Our mission continues, stronger and wiser for what we've learned.